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Abstract: It is elaborated a development dynamic model of accumulation, growth and distribution in 
which endogenous technological innovation plays a significant role. Firms’ rate of labour-saving 
technological innovation is made to depend non-linearly on the distributive (wage and profit) shares, 
with the latter determining both the incentives to innovate and the availability of funding to carry it 
out. As it turns out, the direction and the intensity of the effect of a change in distribution on the rates 
of accumulation and growth depend on the prevailing distribution, with a similar dependence applying 
– alongside the relative bargaining power of capitalists and workers – to the dynamic stability 
properties of the system. Hence, the model does not rely on full capacity utilisation being reached for a 
change in the accumulation and growth regime to take place. 
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Resumo: Elabora-se um modelo de desenvolvimento dinâmico de acumulação de capital, crescimento 
e distribuição em que inovação tecnológica endógena desempenha um papel fundamental. A taxa de 
inovação tecnológica poupadora de mão-de-obra das firmas depende não-linearmente da distribuição 
entre salários e lucros, com esta determinando tanto os incentivos à inovação quanto a disponibilidade 
de fundos para financiá-la. Como resultado, a direção e a intensidade do efeito de uma mudança na 
distribuição sobre as taxas de acumulação e crescimento dependem da distribuição vigente, com uma 
dependência similar sendo aplicável, juntamente com o poder de barganha relativo de capitalistas e 
trabalhadores, às propriedades de estabilidade dinâmica do sistema. Assim, o modelo não se baseia no 
alcance da plena utilização da capacidade para que a mudança no regime de acumulação de capital e 
crescimento aconteça. 
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  The Post Keynesian approach to capital accumulation, growth and distribution can be 
traced back to the models developed independently by N. Kaldor, J. Robinson and L. Pasinetti 
in the 1950s and 1960s, in which a long-run inverse relation between the real wage and the 
growth rate obtained. In the newer Post Keynesian models developed independently by 
authors more closely associated with the Kalecki-Steindl tradition like R. Rowthorn and A. K. 
Dutt in the 1980s, however, that relation between distribution and growth is usually positive. 
The reason is that while in the earlier models capacity utilisation cannot be an adjusting 
variable in the long run, in the newer ones it can be so in whatever run. 
  Once technological change is brought into the picture, labour-saving innovations 
taking place will affect distribution by affecting unit labour costs and thus the share of labour 
in income. This way technological change which raises labour productivity becomes a 
fundamental determinant of capital accumulation and growth, either directly by requiring the 
installation of new machines or indirectly by affecting distribution. Indeed, this influence 
becomes even greater and more complex when technological innovation is made endogenous 
rather than assumed to drop as manna from heaven. Now, when technological change has 
been treated as endogenous in the Post Keynesian literature, it is invariably linked to capital 
accumulation using some variant of either Kaldor's technical progress function or Arrow´s 
learning-by-doing function (e.g. Rowthorn 1981; Dutt 1990, 1994; You 1994; Watanabe 
1997).
1 
  This paper contributes to the Post Keynesian literature by elaborating a dynamic 
model of capital accumulation, growth and distribution in which endogenous technological 
innovation also plays a significant role, though through a different route. Firms' rate of 
labour-saving technological innovation is made to depend on the prevailing distribution, with 
the latter determining both the incentives to innovate and the availability of funding to carry it 
out. The rate of innovation is determined by distribution in a non-linear way, with the former 
being lower for both low and high levels of wage share, and higher for intermediate levels of 
wage share. While at low levels of wage share the availability of funding for innovation is 
high but the incentives to innovate are low, at high levels of wage share the incentives to 
innovate are high but the availability of funding is low. As it turns out, firms’ desired capital 
accumulation and hence the growth rate will also be non-linear in distribution, with the same 
relation applying – along with the relative bargaining power of capitalists and workers – to 
the dynamic stability properties of the system. Hence, the model does not rely on full capacity 
utilization being reached for a change in the capital accumulation and growth regime to take 
place.
2 
                                                 
1 For Kaldor, anything that raises the growth rate also leads to a faster rate of technical change. He formulated 
this idea in several ways, ranging from the technical progress function of his early work (1957, 1961), where the 
growth rate of labour productivity is positively related to the growth rate of capital per worker, to the Verdoorn's 
Law of his later writing (1966), where the growth rate of labour productivity is positively related to the growth 
rate of the economy. Arrow (1962), in turn, takes productivity as rising with experience in production, with this 
experience being measured by cumulative investment – which, in the absence of depreciation, is given by the 
capital stock. 
2 While there is no special connection between the old neoclassical model of growth developed by Solow (1956) 
and the determination of income distribution, the more recent neoclassical theoretical literature on such 
connection has expanded enormously. This literature provides an array of very different explanations for a 
positive correlation between income equality and growth, all of them quite different from the post-keynesian one 
 
  
2  The remainder of the paper is organised in the following manner. Section 2 describes 
the building blocks of the model, whereas Section 3 analyses its behaviour in the short run. 
The behaviour of the model in the long run is discussed in Section 4, while Section 5 
examines one of the possible long-run multiple equilibria dynamics leading to the emergence 
of cyclical behaviour. The paper closes with a summary of the main conclusions derived 
along the way. 
2. The structure of the model 
  The economy is assumed to be a closed one and with no government activities, and to 
produce only one good for both investment and consumption. Only two (homogeneous) 
factors of production are used, capital and labour, which are combined through a fixed-
coefficient technology. This assumption can be justified by reference to an independence of 
the choice of techniques of factor prices or to technological rigidities in factor substitution, it 
being amply supported by a reputable literature. As several eminent contributors to the 
economics of technological change have documented – from David (1975) and Rosenberg 
(1976) to Nelson & Winter (1982) and Dosi (1984) – technological change is marked by 
strong cumulative effects – ‘learning’ in its various forms. As a result, it is typically 
characterised by ‘localised’ shifts in some production function, to use David’s (1975) term, or 
by progress along particular ‘natural trajectories’, to use Nelson & Winter’s (1982) concept. 
This implies that a more rigid, if not (at least in the short run) fixed set of production 
coefficients will prevail.
3 
Capitalist firms in oligopolistic markets carry out production. They produce (and hire 
labour) according to demand, it being modelled only the case in which excess capacity 
prevails.
4 Labour employment is determined by production 
aX L =        ( 1 )  
where   is the employment level,  L X  is the output level, and   stands for the labour-output 
ratio. In turn, firms make accumulation plans described by the following function 
a
h r g
d γ β α + + =       ( 2 )  
                                                                                                                                                          
suggested in this paper, though. To put it briefly, in this mainstream literature an increase in inequality is argued 
to lower growth by raising redistributive government expenditure and therefore distortionary taxation, by 
increasing sociopolitical instability, or by reducing private investment in human capital. Some surveys of this 
literature can be found in Benabou (1996), Perotti (1996) and Aghion, Caroli & Garcia-Peñalosa (1999). 
3 Freeman and Soete (1987) & Verspagen (1990) also showed that localised technological change strongly 
diminishes the short-run possibilities for factor substitution. Probably the most quoted formalisation of localised 
technological change is still the one by Stiglitz & Atkinson (1969). The underlying idea is that for any industrial 
grouping the range of efficient techniques (in terms of relative factor intensity per unit of output) is often very 
small, sometimes reaching the limit of one technological system which rules at any point in time. Localised 
technical change strongly diminishes the short-run possibilities for substitution, and constant improvements of 
one single production technique usually lead to a Leontief shape similar to the one assumed here. 
4 Steindl (1952) claims that firms plan excess capacity so as to be ready for a sudden expansion of sales. First, 
the existence of fluctuations in demand means that the producer wants to be in a boom first, and not to leave the 
sales to new competitors who will press on her market when the boom is over. Second, it is not possible for the 
producer to expand her capacity step by step as her market grows because of the indivisibility and durability of 
the plant and equipment. Finally, there is the issue of entry deterrence: if prices are sufficiently high, entry 
becomes feasible even where capital requirements are great; therefore, the holding of excess capacity allows 
olipolistic firms to confront new entrants by suddenly raising supply and driving prices down. 
 
  
3where α , β , and γ  are all positive parameters,   is firms’ desired accumulation as a ratio 
of the capital stock, 
d g
r  is the profit rate, which is the flow of money profits divided by the 
value of capital stock at output price, and   is the rate of technological innovation, whose 
labour-saving nature is better specified below. To the extent we are dealing with a one-good 
economy, the ‘production’ of technological innovation does not constitute another production 
process or productive sector. Indeed, it is assumed that the single good that can be used for 
both investment and consumption may be used for ‘innovative’ purposes as well.
h
5 
We follow Rowthorn (1981) and Dutt (1984, 1990), who in turn follow Kalecki 
(1971) and Robinson (1956, 1962), and make desired accumulation to depend positively on 
the profit rate. The rationale is that the current profit rate is an index of expected future 
earnings, on the one hand, and provides internal funding for accumulation plans and make it 
easier to raise external funding, on the other hand. Firms’ desired investment is also made to 
depend positively on the innovation rate, the point being that the latter results in more 
investment, at any given level of profit rate, than would otherwise be the case. While Dutt 
(1994) invokes Kalecki’s (1971) claim that the higher the rate of technological change, the 
more desirable is to install new machinery, other plausible reasons for the above specification 
can be called up as well. Indeed, it is compatible with the Marxian contention that cost-
reducing technical change places continuous pressures on any individual firm to invest, with 
Schumpeter's (1912, 1942) view that the process of innovation itself opens up new investment 
opportunities for firms, and with the neo-Schumpeterian notion (e.g. Nelson & Winter 1982) 
that investment behaviour is influenced by the dynamics of technical change.
6 
  At a point in time, the technological parameters are given, having resulted from 
previous technological change and capital accumulation. Over time, though, labour-
augmenting (Harrod-neutral) technological innovation is assumed to take place, which results 
in the labour-output ratio falling at rate h. In terms of the taxonomy proposed by Freeman 
(1982), distinguishing between incremental innovation, radical innovation, new technology 
systems and changes of techno-economic paradigm, we are dealing with the former; that is, 
innovations which occur more or less continuously, although at differing rates in different 
industries, and are concerned only with improvements in the existing array of processes of 
production. Rather than being exogenously given, though, technological innovation depends 
on the prevailing distribution in the following non-linear way 
                                                 
5 Indeed, a more inclusive model could as well drop the assumption of homogeneous labour – e.g. by bringing in 
overhead labour devoted to R&D, who would be remunerated differently from direct labour – and/or of 
homogeneous capital – e.g. by bringing in human or knowledge capital. However interesting a more inclusive 
specification along these lines, it will be the subject of a future research – for which we invite the reader to stay 
tuned. 
6 For Landesmann & Goodwin (1994), the introduction of new technologies may indeed raise the propensity to 
invest. First, firms may not be willing to lose out vis-à-vis competitors by not having the most updated 
technology that could allow them to attract a larger share of demand. Second, firms may expect strong learning-
by-using effects from introducing the new technologies and they may not want to miss out on them. Third, firms 
may expect additional secondary innovations complementary to the initial one, and an early introduction might 
bring further competitive and learning advantages over competitors. Steindl himself admitted later on that his 
Maturity and Stagnation was carried out on the naive assumption that technological change does not affect 
investment activity (Steindl 1981). Actually, in the introduction to the 1976 reprint of the book he had already 
recognised that innovations which are sufficiently advanced, and which can be exploited without too much delay 
and risk, are a powerful inducement to investment. 
 
  
42 σ σ − = h        ( 3 )  
where   is the technological innovation rate and  h σ  is the wage share in output. Since this 
concave-down parabola has two real roots,  0 ) 1 ) 0 ( ( = = h h ,   is positive throughout its 
relevant domain given by 
h
) 1 , 0 ( ∈ σ . The level of distribution which will yield the maximum 
rate of technological innovation is given by  , which means that a higher wage share 
will speed up (slow down) the rate of innovation for levels of distribution below (above)  . 
This simplified innovation function is intended to capture a plausible non-linearity in the 
influence of the wage share on firms’ propensity and ability to adopt labour-saving 
innovations, namely, that the rate of innovation is lower for both low and high levels of wage 
share, it being higher for intermediate ones. While at high levels of profit share the 
availability of funding for innovation is high but the incentives to innovate are low, at low 
levels of profit share the incentives to innovate are high but the availability of funding is low.
2
* = σ / 1
* σ
7 
  The economy is inhabited by two classes, capitalists and workers. Following the 
tradition of Marx, Kalecki (1971), Kaldor (1956), Robinson (1956, 1962) and Pasinetti 
(1962), we assume that these classes have different saving behaviour. Workers provide labour 
and earn only wage income, which is all spent in consumption. They are always in excess 
supply, with the number of potential workers (labour supply) growing at the rate n.
8 
Capitalists receive profit income, which is the entire surplus over wages, and save all of it. 
Division of income is then given by 
rK L P W X + = ) / (       ( 4 )  
where W  is the money wage, P  is the price level, and K  is the capital stock. From eqs. (1) 
and (4), the share of labour in income, σ , is given by 
Va = σ       ( 5 )  
where  V  stands for the real wage. The profit rate is then given by  ) / ( P W =
u r ) 1 ( σ − =        ( 6 )  
where   is the rate of capacity utilisation. Since we assume that the ratio of capacity output 
to the capital stock remains constant, we can identify capacity utilisation with the output-
capital ratio. 
u
                                                 
7 An alternative specification of endogenous technological innovation, rather (neo-)schumpeterian in spirit, can 
be found in Lima (2000). In the context of a Post Keynesian model of capital accumulation and distribution 
slightly similar to the one developed here, the rate of technological innovation is made to depend non-linearly on 
market concentration – which is itself endogenous to the processes of capital accumulation and technological 
change. By examining one possible long-run multiple equilibria it is as well developed a qualitative analysis of 
the potential emergence of endogenous, self-sustaining fluctuations in concentration, growth and distribution. 
8 According to Sawyer (1989), the supply of labour to the capitalist economies (and within capitalist economies, 
supply to the capitalist sectors) can, at least over some range, be readily expanded whenever it is necessary. 
Within a country, the capitalist economy may cover only a part of the economy, so that the capitalist sector can 
pull workers from the non-capitalist sector when demand for labour is relatively high and push workers back 
when demand is low. Other mechanisms include migration of labour from one country to another and changes in 
the age of entry into and departure from the labour force. Therefore, extra supply of labour can be obtained 
when demand is strong by pulling people into the labour force. Conversely, when the overall demand for labor 
is low, unemployment can to some degree be hidden by the re-absorption of workers back into home. 
 
  
5The price level is given at a point in time, but over time it will rise whenever the 
desired markup of firms exceeds their actual markups. Formally, we have 
] [ ˆ
f P σ σ τ − =        ( 7 )  
where P ˆ  is the proportionate rate of change in price,  , and  ) / 1 )( / ( P dt dP τ  is the speed of 
adjustment. As in Dutt (1994), inflation is determined within a framework of conflicting 
income claims, inflation resulting whenever the income claims of workers and capitalists 
exceed the available income. The markup over prime costs, à la Kalecki (1971), is given by 
Wa z P ) 1 ( + =        ( 8 )  
where   is the markup. Given labour productivity, the markup is inversely related to the 
wage share, so that the gap between the desired and the actual markups can be measured by 
the gap between the actual and the desired wage share. The desired markup by firms depends 
on the state of the goods market, and higher capacity utilisation, which reflects more buoyant 
demand conditions, will induce firms to desire a higher profitability. We can express the wage 
share implied by firms’ desired markup as 
z
u f θ ϕ σ − =        ( 9 )  
where ϕ  and θ  are positive parameters. Several arguments can be invoked to support 
procyclicity of the markups. Eichner (1976) argues that during expansions firms may want to 
invest more by generating higher internal savings and therefore desire a higher markup. 
Rowthorn (1977) claims that higher capacity utilisation allows firms to raise prices with less 
fear of being undercut by their competitors, who would gain little by undercutting due to 
higher capacity constraints. Gordon, Weisskopf & Bowles (1984) argue that marked-up prices 
are inversely related to the perceived elasticity of demand, which is a negative function of 
industry concentration and of the fraction of potential competitors that are perceived to be 
quantity-constrained and thus not engaged in or responsive to price competition. In the 
downturn, markup will fall because the fall in capacity utilisation gives rise to a smaller share 
of potential competitors being perceived to be under capacity constraints, and hence to an 
increase in the perceived elasticity of demand facing the firm. Later on, though, we will 
examine how sensitive are the long-run stability properties of the system to this assumption 
that the desired markup rises with capacity utilisation.
9 
  At a point in time the money wage is given, and with labour being always in excess 
supply, employment is determined by labour demand. Over time, though, the money wage 
will change in line with the gap between the wage share desired by workers,  w σ , and the 
actual wage share. As in Dutt (1994), this wage adjustment equation can be expressed as 
                                                 
9 Regarding anticyclicity, Minsky (1975) argues that the fall in sales in a downturn forces firms to raise markups 
to meet outstanding financial obligations. Kalecki (1954) argues that since the markup depends partially on the 
ratio of overheads to prime costs, the rise in this ratio in downturns causes markups to rise. On the neoclassical 
side, Rotemberg & Woodford (1992) claim that it is more difficult for oligopolistic firms to sustain collusive 
prices during booms, when the incentive for any firm to cut its price rises because it becomes more worthwhile 
to capture current sales than to maintain collusion in the future. Bils (1989) argues that demand may become less 
elastic during recessions, allowing firms to increase markups. Chevalier & Scharfstein (1996), in turn, argue that 
since capital-market imperfections constrain the ability of firms to raise external financing, liquidity-constrained 
firms will increase (lower) markups during recessions (booms). An excellent survey of most developments in 
the neoclassical literature on the cyclical behavior of markups can be found in Rotemberg & Woodford (1999). 
 
  
6] [ ˆ σ σ µ − = w W       ( 1 0 )  
where W  is the proportionate rate of change in money wage,  , and  ˆ ) / 1 )( / ( W dt dW µ  is the 
speed of adjustment. The wage share desired – and bargained for – by workers is assumed to 
depend on their bargaining power in the labour market. A higher employment rate, by raising 
workers´ bargaining power, will stimulate workers to desire a higher wage share, so that 
e w λ η σ + =        ( 1 1 )  
where η and λ  are positive parameters and   is the employment rate,  , which is linked 
to the state of the goods market in the following way 
e N L/
uk e =         ( 1 2 )  
where   stands for the ratio of capital stock to labour supply in productivity units, that is, 
, with   being the supply of labour. This formal link between   and e is 
necessary because the fixed-coefficient nature of the technology implies that an increase in 
output in the short run will be necessarily accompanied by an increase in employment. 
k
/(N ) /a K k = N u
  Since firms will produce according to demand and operate below full capacity, the 
equality between desired investment and saving will be reached by changes in capacity 
utilisation. Assuming that capital does not depreciate,  g , the growth rate of capital stock, 
which is the growth rate for this one-good economy, is given by 
r g =        ( 1 3 )  
which follows from the assumptions that workers do not save and capitalists save all of their 
income.
10 
3. The behaviour of the model in the short run 
  The short run is defined as a time period in which the stock of capital, K , the supply 
of labour,  , the labour-output ratio,  , the price level,  N a P , and the money wage rate, W , 
can all be taken as given. The existence of excess capacity implies that capacity utilisation 
will adjust to remove any excess demand or supply in the economy, which implies that in 
short-run equilibrium,  . Substituting from (2), (3), (6) and (13), we can solve for the 
short-run equilibrium value of u  given 
d g g =
σ  and the other parameters, to obtain 
) 1 )( 1 (





= u       ( 1 4 )  
                                                 
10 Interestingly, variable capacity utilisation has been claimed by some proponents of the real business cycle 
approach to be a source of propagation of technology shocks. Burnside & Eichenbaum (1996), for example, 
models variable capacity utilisation by assuming that technology depends on effective capital services and 
effective hours of work. Depreciation is a function of capital utilisation, and in equilibrium firms will choose to 
hoard capital, so they can increase its effective stock at once in response to shocks that raise the marginal 
product of capital. However, the supply-side nature of this approach makes its determination of capacity 
utilisation quite distinct from the demand-driven one pursued here. Besides, technological change is 
endogenously determined in the model of this paper, rather than being guided by exogenous shocks as in the real 
business cycle approach – which actually assumes that the economy is always at full-employment equilibrium 
and therefore has generally no intrinsic cyclical movements. 
 
  
7  Regarding stability, we assume a Keynesian short-run adjustment mechanism stating 
that output will change in proportion to the excess demand in the goods market. This means 
that the equilibrium value for u  will be stable provided the denominator of the expression in 
(14) is positive, which implies that aggregate saving is more responsive than desired 
investment to changes in capacity utilisation. In turn, to assume that  1 0 < < β , as required for 
stability of capacity utilisation throughout its relevant domain, ensures a positive value for   

















     ( 1 5 )  
Like in the newer Post Keynesian model developed independently by Rowthorn 
(1981) and Dutt (1984, 1990), an increase in the wage share – by redistributing income from 
capitalists who do save to workers who do not – raises the level of activity. For any  , a 
rise in the wage share will also increase the innovation rate, raise firms’ desired accumulation 
and hence increase capacity utilisation even more. Even though a rise in the wage share will 
lower the rate of innovation – and put a downward pressure on desired accumulation – when 
, that will not be strong enough to make for a falling capacity utilisation. 
* σ σ <
* σ σ >
Now, our assumption that workers do not save and capitalists save all of their income 
implies that the rates of profit and accumulation are identical, as shown by eq. (13). For a 
given level of capacity utilisation, as shown by (6), an increase in the wage share, by lowering 
the profit share, will unambiguously exert a downward pressure on the rates of profit and 
accumulation. However, a higher wage share may generate a rise in capacity utilisation that is 
strong enough to more than compensate the accompanying fall in the profit share, thus 
leading to a rise in the rates of profit and accumulation. All this ambiguity is captured by the 
expressions for   and  , which, using (6), (13) and (14) are 
* * g r =
* *
σ σ g r =
) 1 (





= = g r      ( 1 6 )  
and 
) 1 (





= = g r       ( 1 7 )  
  Hence, a rise in the wage share will raise (lower) the rates of profit and accumulation 
when  . For lower levels of profit share, a rise in the wage share, by lowering 
the rate of innovation, will make for a falling accumulation (and growth) rate.
* σ σ < ) (
* σ σ >
11 Therefore, the 
model does not rely on full capacity utilisation being reached for a change in the 
accumulation and growth regime to take place.
12 
                                                 
11 Were capitalists to reduce their saving rate, in turn, it can be checked that the short-run equilibrium values of 
capacity utilisation and growth would both rise, in line with the paradox of thrift. 
12 However, it should be underlined that it is not the non-linear nature of the innovation function itself that 
makes for that change in the growth regime, but the dependence of the desired accumulation on the rate of 
technological innovation, as shown by eq. (2) above. Indeed, it can be checked that assuming away that 
dependence would imply a different behaviour for the growth rate. While capacity utilisation would keep rising 
 
  
8The relevant distributional domain can therefore be divided into two regions. In the 
first one (hereafter LW region), in which the wage share is lower  , the rates of 
technological innovation, capacity utilisation and growth are all directly related to the wage 
share. In the second one (hereafter HW region), in which the wage share is higher ( , 
while capacity utilisation is still directly related to the wage share, the rates of innovation and 
growth become inversely related to it. 
) (
* σ σ <
)
* σ σ >
4. The behaviour of the model in the long run 
  In the long run we assume that the short-run equilibrium values of the variables are 
always attained, with the economy moving over time due to changes in the stock of capital, 
K , the supply of labour,  , the labour-output ratio, a, the price level,  N P , and the money 
wage rate, W . One way of following the behaviour of the system over time is by examining 
the dynamic behaviour of the short-run state variables σ , the wage share, and  , the ratio of 
capital stock to labour supply in productivity units. From the definition of these variables, we 
have the following state transition functions: 
k
a P W ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ + − = σ         (18) 
and 
a N K k ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ + − =         (19) 
Substitution from (3) into (18), from (11) and (12) into (10), and then from the 
resulting expression into (18), along with substitution from (9) into (7), and then from the 
ensuing expression into (18), yields 
) ( ) ( ) ( ˆ
2 σ σ θ ϕ σ τ σ λ µ σ − − + − − − = u uk      (20) 
where   is given by eq. (14). Substituting from (6) into (13) and then the resulting expression 
into (19), and from (3) into (19), we obtain 
u
n u k − − − − = ) ( ) 1 ( ˆ 2 σ σ σ       (21) 
where   is again given by eq. (14), while   is the growth rate of labour supply, assumed to 
be exogenously given. A constant unemployment rate as a long-run characteristic, required to 
make for a stationary wage share, implies rate of economic growth equal to the rate at which 
the reserve army is replenished through growth of the labour supply and labour productivity. 
Since we are dealing with endogenous technological innovation and exogenous labour supply 
growth, long-run equilibrium is determined by the interaction between the warranted rate 
(capital accumulation) and the natural rate (labour supply growth plus growth of 
productivity), with the course of both of them depending on the prevailing distribution. 
u n
  Eqs. (20) and (21), after using (14), constitute a planar autonomous two-dimensional 
non-linear system of differential equations in which the rates of change of σ  and   depend 
on the levels of 
k
σ  and  , and on the parameters of the system. The Jacobian matrix of partial 
derivatives for this dynamic system is given by 
k
) 2 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( / ˆ
* *
11 σ θ τ λ µ σ σ σ σ − − + − − = ∂ ∂ = u ku J      (22) 
                                                                                                                                                          
with the wage share, the rate of growth would cease to depend on distribution to become constant. The next 





12 > = ∂ ∂ = ku k J µλ σ         (23) 
) 2 1 ( / ˆ *
21 σ σ σ − − = ∂ ∂ = g k J         (24) 
0 / ˆ
22 = ∂ ∂ = k k J          (25) 
Indeed, not all of these partial derivatives, evaluated at a stationary point, can be 
unambiguously signed. Eq. (23) shows that an increase in the ratio of capital to labour supply 
in productivity units, by raising the employment rate, will raise the wage share desired by 
workers and thereby raise the rate of increase in money wages. Eq. (25) shows that since an 
increase in k  does not affect either σ  or u  there is no effect either on the rate of 
accumulation or the rate of innovation, and hence no effect on the rate of growth of  . Eq. 
(22) shows that the impact of a change in the wage share on its rate of growth is mediated 
directly and indirectly by its impact on capacity utilisation. The reason is that both the wage 
share desired by workers and the wage share implied by firms’ desired markup depend on 
capacity utilisation. While 
k
f σ  depends directly on the state of the goods market,  w σ  depends 
directly on the state of the labour market. Now, given the fixed-coefficient nature of the 
technology, an increase in capacity utilisation in the short run will necessarily be 
accompanied by an increase in employment. Whether, in turn, a change in the wage share will 
raise or lower the rate of innovation depends on the level of distribution. As for the sign of 
, it would be given by the relative impact of changes in the wage share on the rates of 
growth and technological innovation. However, it is seen below that a necessary condition for 
the occurrence of at least one equilibrium with   within the relevant domain given by 
21 J
0 <
0 ˆ ˆ = = k σ
1 < σ  is that the absolute value of  σ d / dh  is greater than the absolute value of  . 




  We now have all the elements for a qualitative phase-diagrammatic analysis of this 
dynamic system. The way we proceed is by analysing the (local) stability of an equilibrium 
position in each one of the two regions into which we divided the meaningful subset of the 
domain. Now, eq. (21) shows that the equation describing the   k = 0 isocline is quadratic in 
the wage share, which means that there may be up to two values for the wage share in the 
relevant ( k , σ )-space at which a respective vertical   k = 0 isocline would be located – recall 
that   k  does not depend on   k = 0.
13 Given this geometry, the way we proceed is by analysing 
the (local) stability properties of the equilibrium solution in each one of the two regions were 
one of the   k = 0 isoclines and some portion of the  0 ˆ = σ  isocline to be located there.
14 
In the LW region, a higher wage share exerts an upward pressure on its rate of change 
by raising capacity utilisation and thus employment, which then raises the wage share desired 
                                                 
13 It can be checked that a necessary condition for these two values of the wage share to be contained in the 
relevant domain given by (  is that  ) 1 , 0 1 < +γ β , which we assume – recall that in the preceding section it 
was assumed that 0 1 < < β  to ensure that the short-run equilibrium value of capacity utilisation is positive and 
stable. Using eqs. (3) and (17), in turn, it can be easily checked that  1 < +γ β  implies that the absolute value 
of  σ d dh/  is greater than the absolute value of dg , as mentioned right above.  σ d /
*
14 We do not consider the case given by   since it implies that 
* σ σ = 0 21 = J , and hence that  0 ) ( = J Det . 
 
  
10by workers. However, this same rise in capacity utilisation also raises the markup desired by 
firms, which then exerts a downward pressure on the rate of change of the wage share by 
lowering firms’ desired wage share. Besides, a higher wage share exerts a downward pressure 
on its rate of change by raising the innovation rate. The sign of   depends on the relative 
strength of all these effects, with closer inspection of eq. (22) revealing that it is negative 
unless the impact via workers’ desired wage share is very strong. Recalling that the existence 
of an equilibrium solution in this region implies a negative sign for  , a positive sign for 
, which is a necessary condition for stability, will follow no matter the sign of  . 
The latter, in turn, by having the same sign as Tr , will ultimately determine whether the 
long-run equilibrium solution with   is stable or unstable. 
11 J
21 J
) (J Det 11 J
) (J
0 ˆ ˆ = = k σ
In case   is negative, Fig. 1 shows that the resulting steady-state solution will be 
stable. Given that   is positive, the (local) slope of the 
11 J
12 J  σ = 0 isocline, which is given by 
, is positive. Since  ) / ( 12 11 J J − k ∂ σ ∂ / ˆ  is positive,   σ  undergoes a steady rise as   increases, 
so that the sign of 
k
 σ  is negative (positive) to the right (left) of the   σ = 0 locus, which 
explains the direction of the horizontal arrows. The slope of the   k = 0 isocline, given by 
, is equal to zero. Given that  ,  ) / ( 22 21 J J − 0 / ˆ < ∂σ ∂k  k  undergoes a steady fall as σ  rises, 
thus implying that the sign of   k  is negative (positive) to the right (left) of the   k = 0 isocline, 
which explains the direction of the vertical arrows. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
In case   is positive, which means that the rate of change in nominal wages is very 
responsive to changes in capacity utilisation, Fig. 2 shows that the resulting steady-state 
solution will be unstable. Given that   is positive, the (local) slope of the 
11 J
12 J  σ = 0 isocline 
becomes positive, with   σ  again undergoing a steady rise as   increases. As before, the slope 
of the 
k
 k = 0 isocline is equal to zero, with   k  undergoing a steady fall as σ  increases. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
In the HW region, a higher wage share also exerts an upward pressure on its rate of 
change by raising capacity utilisation and thus employment, which then raises the wage share 
desired by workers. However, this same rise in capacity utilisation raises the markup desired 
by firms as well, which then exerts a downward pressure on the rate of change of the wage 
share by lowering firms’ desired wage share. Besides, a higher wage share now exerts an 
upward pressure on its rate of change by lowering the innovation rate, with the sign of   
depending on the relative strength of all these effects. Regarding the sign of  , recall that 
the existence of an equilibrium solution in this region implies that it is positive. 
11 J
21 J
In case   is negative, Fig. 3 shows that the resulting steady-state solution will be 
saddle-point unstable, given that 
11 J
0 ) ( < J Det . The slope of the   σ = 0 isocline is positive, 
while the direction of the horizontal arrows is given by the positive (negative) sign of  k ∂ σ ∂ / ˆ  
( ∂σ σ ∂ / ˆ ). The slope of the   k = 0 isocline, in turn, is equal to zero, while the direction of the 
vertical arrows is given by the positive sign of  . Hence, the equilibrium solution 
with   is saddle-point unstable, with the corresponding separatrix having a negative 
slope. Indeed, an equilibrium solution located in this region will be saddle-point unstable 
0 / ˆ < ∂σ ∂k
0 ˆ = k ˆ = σ
 
  
11anyway, the reason being that  0 ) ( < J Det

 no matter the sign of  . In case the latter is 
positive, however, both the slope of the 
11 J
σ = 0 isocline and the slope of the separatrix of the 
saddle-point become negative. 
∂σ σ ∂ / ˆ
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
  Now, to evaluate how sensitive are all these stability requirements to the assumption 
that firms’ desired markup is directly related to capacity utilisation, let us briefly examine the 
general implications of assuming an inverse relationship instead – along the lines briefly 
recalled on fn. 8. In the LW region, where wage-led growth obtains, recall that equilibrium 
will be stable (unstable) in case   is negative (positive). In comparison to the original 
specification with procyclical markups, therefore, firms’ desired markup being anticyclical 
would lower the chances of stability. The reason is that now a higher wage share, by raising 
capacity utilisation, would raise the wage share implied by the (lower) markup desired by 
firms and hence make for a lower inflation rate – and a weaker downward pressure on the rate 
of change of the wage share – than before. In the HW region, in turn, where a profit-led 
growth regime obtains, an anticyclical desired markup would not remove the source of 
saddle-point instability, the reason being that  0 ) ( < J Det  no matter the sign of  . 11 J
15 
5. Multiple equilibria analysis 
  The non-linearity embodied in the desired investment function through the innovation 
function makes for the possibility of double equilibria within the relevant domain. As seen 
above, there may be up to two real values for the share of wages at which a corresponding 
vertical   k = 0 isocline would be located in the ( ) ,k σ -space. Let us call  1 σ  and  2 σ  these two 
levels of wage share located in the LW and HW, respectively, and call   and   the 
corresponding 
 k1 = 0 
2 0 = k
 k = 0 isoclines. 
  Amongst the possible configurations leading to multiple equilibria, one worthy of a 
more detailed phase-diagrammatic analysis contains an unstable equilibrium in the LW 
region,  , and a saddle-point unstable equilibrium in the HW region,  – as shown in 
isolation in Figs. 2 and 3, respectively. This situation is pictured in Fig. 4, where it is revealed 
an interesting potentially cyclical feature of equilibrium points such as  . It can be seen that 
there is a subset of the phase plane which the economy will never leave in the event it gets 
into it. We refer to this subset as zone of stability and to its complement as zone of instability. 
The zone of stability can be found by tracing back the path of the economy which leads into 
the higher part of the separatrix all the way through the LW region and then back to the HW 
region. 
1 E 2 E
1 E
[Figure 4 about here] 
  Once inside the zone of stability, the economy will move cyclically. Suppose we 
begin a trajectory at point A in Fig 4. The direction of motion of the system indicates that it 
                                                
15 In turn, recall from fn. 11 that to assume away the positive dependence of desired accumulation on the rate of 
innovation would make for an independence of the growth rate from distribution. However, the   isocline 
would still be quadratic in the wage share, while the sign of   would remain the same in each one of the two 
regions. Hence, the same qualitative possibilities in terms of equilibrium solution for these regions would arise. 




12must flow leftward down until the lower part of the   isocline is reached, after which it 
will flow leftward up. After a while, the system will end up reaching the higher portion of the 
0 ˆ
1 = k
 σ = 0
ˆ
1
 isocline in the LW region, and will start flowing rightward up until the upper part of 
the  k  isocline is reached. Given this direction of motion, the system may reach the 
borderline between the LW and HW regions before reaching the lower portion of the 
0 =
 σ = 0 
isocline in the LW region. In case the system reaches the HW region – through, say, point B – 
before reaching the   σ = 0 isocline, it will keep flowing rightward down until the lower part 
of   σ = 0 isocline in the HW region is reached, after which it will flow leftward down. If by a 
fluke the system reaches back the borderline between the LW and HW regions at point A, the 
cyclical motion just described will then re-start and the system, if left undisturbed, will keep 
having this cyclical motion. In case the system reaches the LW region through a point above 
A, say point C, another cyclical motion will re-start. Since trajectories of differential 
equations with continuous partial derivatives must be unique, they cannot cross each other. 
Hence, this new cyclical motion will have to be completed either at a point above C in the 
borderline between the LW and HW regions or in the lower part of the   σ = 0 isocline in the 
LW region. 
 Now,  E  being unstable means that there is a neighbourhood of it, say D, within 
which all trajectories of the system will move away from  . Since the system will end up 
reaching that neighbourhood along the hypothesised trajectory initiated at point A, it will not 
reach  . Indeed, there may eventually be a closed, bounded area encircling the 
neighbourhood D, and from which no trajectory will exit. Since this area would contain no 
equilibrium points, the Poincaré-Bendixson theorem would then ensure that it must contain at 
least one stable limit cycle (Beavis & Dobbs 1990). But whether or not some limit cycle will 
emerge, the system will move cyclically in this subset of the zone of stability, which shows its 
propensity to experience endogenous, self-sustaining fluctuations in the capital to efficiency 
labour supply ratio and the wage share, with technological innovation, capacity utilisation, 




  Recall that in the LW region the rates of technological innovation, capacity utilisation 
and accumulation are all directly related to the wage share. In the situation pictured in Fig. 4, 
a rise in the wage share will raise the rate of change of nominal wage by more than it raises 
the rate of change in prices and the rate of innovation combined, so that the level and the rate 
of change of the wage share move in the same direction. On the other hand, the wage share 
and the rate of change of the capital to efficiency labour supply ratio move in the opposite 
direction. A rise in the wage share, for instance, will both raise the rate of accumulation and 
raise the labour supply in productivity units, though the absolute value of the latter effect is 
greater than the absolute value of the former one. Also, recall that the fixed-proportion nature 
of the technology implies that capacity utilisation and the rate of employment move in the 
same direction, with the strength of the connection being given precisely by the capital to 
efficiency labour supply ratio. The higher  , the higher the change in the employment rate 
brought about by a change in capacity utilisation. Since the price-setting power of capitalists 
and workers is endogenous to capital accumulation through a conflict theory of inflation, a 
fall in  , for instance, given the wage share, leads to a fall in the extent to which the nominal 
wage change effect is greater than the price change and innovation effects combined. 





13of the wage share move in the same (opposite) direction throughout the domain precisely 
because   does not fall (rise) enough to make for a cyclical reversal. In the zone of stability, 
on the other hand, the system will move cyclically precisely because   can rise or fall to the 






  Starting from a point in the upper part of the   σ = 0 isocline in the LW region, for 
instance, a rise in the wage share will raise the rates of innovation, capacity utilisation and 
accumulation rate. At such levels of σ  and  , though,   will keep rising until the upper part 
of the k  isocline is reached, after which further rises in the wage share will raise 
k k
0 ˆ σ  and 
lower  , with higher levels of wage share carrying the seeds of their own reversal. Once the 
lower part of the 
k
 σ = 0 isocline is reached, σ  will have risen, and k  have fallen, by enough 
for the upward motion of the wage share to cease. A lower wage share will, by lowering the 
rates of innovation, capacity utilisation and accumulation, reduce σ  and k  even more, until 
the lower part of the   isocline is reached. At that point,  0 = ˆ
1 k σ  and   will have fallen by 
enough for the reversal of the downward motion of σ  to occur. Once   has fallen, and   
have risen, by enough, the upper part of the 
k
 σ = 0 isocline will then be reached back. 
  Therefore, this model shares with the classic contribution by Goodwin (1967) a 
cyclical growth dynamics governed by the interaction between capital accumulation, 
employment and distribution.
16 Unlike the Goodwin model, though, this one allows effective 
demand to play a role through a variable degree of capacity utilisation, incorporates price and 
nominal wage dynamics by means of a conflict theory of inflation, and is based on an 
endogenous mechanism of technological change. If left undisturbed, the Goodwin model will 
produce conservative cyclical fluctuations in the wage share and in the rate of employment. 
However, the trajectories will no longer be closed orbits if direct feedbacks from the wage 
share to its rate of change – or from the level of the employment rate to its rate of change – 
are introduced. As the partial derivatives (22)-(25) show, this model introduces a complex 
non-linear feedback from the wage share to its rate of change through variable capacity 
utilisation, conflict inflation and endogenous technological change. Nonetheless, Fig. 2 shows 
that convenient restrictions in the parameters of the  0 ˆ = σ  isocline might lead to the 
emergence of a cyclical dynamics à la Goodwin for lower levels of wage share. 
These general features of the model are shared with Dutt (1994), from which we have 
drawn a lot of inspiration. Unlike the latter, though, this model does not rely on full capacity 
utilisation being reached for profit-led accumulation and growth as well as multiple equilibria 
to obtain within the distributive domain. Given the non-linear investment function used here, 
the system may well experience self-sustaining fluctuations in the same pair of state variables 
( k , σ ) featured in Dutt (1994) – eventually alternating phases of wage-led accumulation and 
growth with phases of profit-led accumulation and growth – even below full capacity 
utilisation. Besides, while technological change is endogeneised in Dutt (1994) by being 
                                                 
16 In the Goodwin model, capital accumulation taking place increases employment. Once the employment rate 
has crossed a threshold level in the neighbourhood of full employment, the real wage begins to rise. This lowers 
the rate of profit and therefore the possible rate of accumulation. When the accumulation rate declines 
sufficiently, the employment rate falls low enough to cause the real wage to decline. This re-establishes the rate 
of profit, so that the rate of accumulation can then increase once again. 
 
  
14made to depend linearly on the rate of accumulation, in this model it is endogeneised by being 
made to depend non-linearly on distribution.
17 
6. Summary 
This paper contributes to the Post Keynesian literature on capital accumulation and 
distribution by developing a macrodynamic model in which technological innovation depends 
non-linearly on distribution, with the latter determining both the incentives to innovate and 
the availability of funding to carry it out. In turn, when technological change has been treated 
as endogenous in the Post Keynesian literature, it is invariably linked to capital accumulation 
using some variant of either Kaldor's technical progress function or Arrow´s learning-by-
doing function. As it turns out, capital accumulation and growth also become non-linear in 
distribution, with the same dependence applying – alongside the relative bargaining power of 
capitalists and workers – to the dynamic stability properties of the system. 
Inflation is determined within a framework of conflicting income claims, with the 
relative price-setting power of capitalists and workers being endogenous to accumulation – 
the power of capitalists (workers) to drive up prices (nominal wages) rising with capacity 
utilisation (the employment rate). In the short run, the existence of excess capacity implies 
that capacity utilisation will adjust to remove any excess demand or supply in the economy. 
As it turns out, a change in the wage share will lead to a change in the same direction in 
capacity utilisation. For lower levels of profit share, however, a rise in the wage share, by 
lowering the rate of innovation, will make for a falling accumulation and growth. Hence, the 
model does not rely on full capacity utilization being reached for a change in the capital 
accumulation and growth regime to take place. 
  Regarding long run dynamics, a steady-state equilibrium (in distribution and the ratio 
of capital stock to labour supply in productivity units) with lower shares of wage will be 
stable (unstable) in case workers´ wage-setting power is weak (strong) enough. For higher 
shares of wages, in turn, steady-state equilibrium will be saddle-point unstable no matter the 
relative bargaining power of capitalists and workers. While these stability properties were 
derived under the assumption that the markup is procyclical, they mostly survive to a change 
of assumption to an anticyclical one, ceteris paribus. Indeed, while stability of the steady-
state with lower shares of wage would now require a weaker wage-setting power by workers, 
that saddle-point instability with higher shares of wage would not be removed by an 
anticyclical markup. The paper closed with a qualitative phase-diagrammatic analysis of a 
possible configuration leading to double equilibria and cyclical behaviour, showing the 
propensity of the system to experience endogenous, self-sustaining fluctuations. 
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Figure 1. Long-run dynamics: stable equilibrium in the LW region 
 





          Figure 2. Long-run dynamics: unstable equilibrium in the LW region 
 





19Figure 3.  Long-run dynamics: saddle-point unstable equilibrium in the HW region 
 




          Figure 4. Long-run dynamics: multiple equilibria, stability zone and cyclical behaviour 
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